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CHALLENGING THE SOCIAL COMPOSITION
OF FEDERAL JURIES IN COLORADO
By HARRY K. NIER, JR., of the Denver Bar

The scope of this article deals with the protection afforded
parties in challenging the social composition of both grand and
petit juries. Perhaps the basis of social composition has been less
frequently used as a grounds for challenging petit juries because
the historical aspect of the grand jury system in Anglo-American
law was a reaction against the Star Chamber system which had
discriminated against political and religious dissenters in England. The application of the law pertaining to social composition
is the same, however, to both grand and petit or trial juries. This
is not so in the case or individual composition for while in the
instance of a petit jury a juror may be challenged for cause for
many individual reasons, such as for example relationship with
one of the parties, challenges of grand jurors on an individual
basis are practicably not available except as provided by statute.1
This article deals specifically with the topic as applied to Federal
Courts although for the most part it could have a more general
application, particularly in those states which have not abolished
the grand jury system.
Malus Animus as to exclusion or inclusion of particular social
groups has been the historical test of challenge as to social composition but as to what extent the Courts have and will imply this
state of mind from objective data has been the topic of much
conjecture among members of the legal profession. A recent Warren Supreme Court decision 2 has brought forth a new interest in
the subject, and here in Colorado, although such challenges have
been rare, attempts at challenges have been made in two very
recent criminal cases which have not been finally decided. The
challnge by its very nature requires a formidable attempt because
of the difficulty of proof. It is hoped that this article will serve,
not to predict, but rather to point out some of the significant factors to be considered.
I.

APPLICABLE STATUTORY LAW

A. Qualification of Jurors
Before 1948 the qualifications for jurors in Federal Courts
depended entirely upon state laws, but on June 25, 1948, the
judiciary procedure code was revised to prescribe uniform standards according to federal law. 3 To qualify, the juror must: (1)
be a citizen of 21 years of age, residing within the judicial district,
(2) not have been convicted of a state or federal crime punishable
by imprisonment for more than one year, (3) be able to read,
write, speak and understand the English language, (4) be sui juris
and physically able to render efficient jury service, and (5) be
'See topic I, A, infra.

v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 74 S. Ct. Adv. 667 (1954).
'Title 28, U.S.C.A., Sec. 1861.

2Hernandez
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competent to serve by the law of the state in which the district
court is held. The Colorado statute pertaining to jury qualification has almost identical provisions which require citizenship of
the state, a twenty-one year minimum age limit, absence of a
felony conviction and a mere speaking knowledge and understanding of the English language. 4 Of course certain professions and
trades are and may be exempted by the judge for reasons of hardship and impropriety as is customary and as is set forth in similar
statutes by all states and the federal government.
B. Manner of Selection of Jurors
Early statutes authorized federal courts in impaneling juries
to follow the laws and usages of the state in which the court was
located, 5 but since the Act of Congress of March 3, 1911, no particular method of selection has been prescribed by federal statutes
in a precise manner. 6 Because no concrete definitive statutory
procedure for selecting juries is to be found in the sections dealing with the entire matter of juries which are in title 28, U.S.C.A.,
sec. 1861 et seq., complete administrative discretion is placed in
the hands of the jury officials. Therein lies a fertile field of potential error. It creates a federal problem, the momentum of which
is increasing in intensity as attested to by the volume of applicable
decisions in recent years. It must be kept in mind that the fact
that current procedures for the selection of panels are of long
standing and are sanctioned by the District Judges, and that jury
officials act with patently the best of motives in following these
procedures will not prevent their invalidity on a challenge to
the array.
The rules of the United States District Court for the District
of Colorado, and more specifically rule 18 pertaining to jurors,
selection and service, do not narrow the limits of the wide administrative discretion of the officials. They merely state that the
names of jurors be selected as provided in the act of Congress
of March 3, 1911, which has been substantially incorporated into
the present act. In all circuits the officials who select the jurors
are the clerk of the court or his deputy, and a jury commissioner
who shall be a good citizen residing in the district, and a well
known member of the principal political party in the district, oppos-7
ing to that which the Clerk, or his deputy then acting, may belong.
In The United States District Court for the District of Colorado
both grand and petit juries are drawn from the same list; there
is no system regulating the times when the names for the list shall
be secured, but the list is replenished from time to time; the list
is composed of names from 17 counties surrounding Denver, preColo. Stat. Ann., Chap. 95, Sec. 1 (1935).
*Act. Cong. 1879, c. 52, Sec. 2.
* Jurors must be returned from such parts of the district as the court may
direct, so as to be most favorable to an impartial trial, and so as not to incur
an unnecessary expense, or unduly burden the citizens of any part of the district with such service. 28 U.S.C.A., Sec. 413.
, Title 28, U.S.C.A., Sec. 1864.
*
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dominantly from counties which are north of Denver; names are
obtained without system from clerks of state district courts from
their jury lists and acquaintances or from postmasters or other
leading citizens if clerks of courts are not available; names are
supposed to be secured proportionally from areas (counties) according to population; telephone books are not resorted to because
of change of address, deaths, etc.-an exception is Denver where
occasionally Denver telephone books are used; a good portion of
Denver County names are secured from a perusal of jury payrolls
from the District Courts for the City of Denver; after sufficient
names are secured questionnaires are sent by mail to each name
and upon return of the questionnaires, qualified jurors are selected
from answers elicited by the questionnaire and put into the box
drawn; names are also selected from
from which the panels are
8
latest naturalization lists.
II.

APPLICABLE DECISIONS

Although no particular method of selection has been prescribed by the statutes, judicial decisions have established the
constitutional principles that in selecting names of citizens qualified for jury service, there must be no discrimination against or
exclusion from service of jurors otherwise qualified to serve, by
reason of race or economic status. These decisions are fortified
by some federal statutes which have as yet not been utilized to
the fullest potential by those who would seek for fairer social
composition.9
Correlating with these unanimous decisions which will be
discussed presently is the power of the Supreme Court to keep
a fatherly look over all procedure in the Federal Courts. The early
cases dealing with improperly drawn juries were state cases and
the peg used by the Supreme Court to hang its hat on was the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution, requiring under the sixth amendment that jury panels
in all criminal cases, including those tried in state courts, be impartial and reasonably competent. But with the increasing amount
of awareness of federal jury inequities it is important to note that
the Court said in Fay v. New York: 10
Over Federal proceedings we may exercise a supervisory power with greater freedom to reflect our notions
of public policy than we may constitutionally exert over
sThis information was stated to the author in an interview with G. Walter
Bowman, Clerk for The United States District Court for The District of Colorado.
I The Judiciary Code under Title 28, Sec. 1863, provides that no citizen shall
be excluded from service as grand or petit juror in any federal court on
account of race or color. Other statutes such as the Civil Rights Act under Title
42, Sec. 1981 et seq., authorize civil suits against any official for depriving any
persons of any civil rights under color of a statute, custom or usage of any
state. The criminal code under Title 42, Secs. 242 and 243, makes such act a
crime. Notable, however, is the lack of emphasis in all of these statutes on the
rights of those persons in a separate class by reason of economic status.
" 332 U.S. 261 at page 287.
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proceedings in state courts, when these expressions of
policy are not necessarily embodied in the concept of due
process.
In holding that the test for an improperly drawn jury is that it
is impaneled with an actual intent and design to discriminate,
most of the decisions have refuted the claim that proportional
representation according to classes is a necessary prerequisite of
a properly drawn jury, although allowing for the requirement
that a jury must represent a cross section of the people." The
courts from time to time have passed upon voluminous factual
reports and tables offered by petitioners through statisticians,
attempting to prove discrimination by objective data because of
absence of subjective testimony tending to indicate intent or design and have repeatedly held in opinions based more upon questions of fact than mixed law and fact that such data was insufficient to prove discrimination.' 2 As a result, a very knotty situation
has arisen because intent or design or prejudice is an intangible
thing to prove. There is always at least the danger of prejudice
in the exclusion or limitation situation, and because of this, even
if no prejudice is shown, this hidden danger should be sufficient
reason for condemning the exclusion or limitation. Mr. Justice
Murphy indicated the same in Glasser v. U.S. 3 where speaking for
the Court, he said:
In all cases the constitutional safeguards are to be
jealously preserved for the benefit of the accused, but
especially is this true where the scales of justice may be
delicately poised between guilt and innocence. Then error, which under some circumstances would not be ground
for reversal, cannot be brushed aside as immaterial, since
there is a real chance that it might have provided the
slight impetus which swings the scales toward guilt.
And in McNabb v. U.S.,' 4 the Court said through Mr. Justice
Frankfurter:
. . . Judicial supervision of the administration of
criminal justice in the federal courts implies the duty
of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of
procedure and evidence. Such standards are not satisfled merely by observance of those minimal historic safeguards for securing by reason which are summarized as
"due process of law" . .

III. WHAT HAS CONSTITUTED PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION
A. ProportionalRepresentation
On the question of what constitutes sufficient proof of de"See for example Dennis v. U.S., 183 F. (2d) 201.
12Ibid.

3315 U.S. 60 (1942).
" 218 U.S. 332, 63 S. Ct. 608.
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liberate discrimination, no two cases of course are exactly alike.
They hold generally that mere lack of proportional representation
is not grounds, but by way of reasoning base conclusions that
prejudice exists primarily on such evidence. Thus in International
Longshoreman's & Warehouse Union v. Ackerman,1 5 a case decided in Hawaii, the District Court stated in its opinion that, "it
had permitted enough evidence to come into the record to demonstrate the erroneous method employed in selecting the 1947 Maui
County jury."
There was evidence which we believe to be credible
and from which we find that 84% of the persons who
were selected and listed for grand jury service in 1947
came from the ranks of the employer-entrepreneur group
and their salaried (non-labor) employees. The -record
demonstrates also that other groups in the community,
including labor, had approximately but a 16% representation on the 1947 grand jury list.
A close examination of the cases reveals that the Supreme Court
has definitely evolved its attitude into the appreciation of the fact
that prejudice can be implied from objective data although seldom
if ever has it so explicitly stated.
An historical prospect of the development of such an attitude
begins with Neal v. Delaware 16 and spotlights a body of legal reasoning whose impact upon criminal trials and convictions of Negroes is having repercussions throughout the Southern states today.
Neal v. Delaware was decided in 1880. This case did not concern
a question of systematic limitation, but a case of absolute and
purposed exclusion. The Negro defendant charging discriminatory
action on the part of the jury commissioners brought in testimony
to show that though the Negro population exceeded more than
26,000 in a total population of less than 150,000, no Negro had
ever been summoned as a juror. Other testimony showed that
there were Negroes qualified to serve as jurors. Such testimony
alone was found by the Supreme Court to make out a prima facie
case of discrimination. The Neal case established through the
voice of the Supreme Court the mandate that systematic exclusion
of a class or race is reversible error and has been followed and
supported by many decisions in various jurisdictions. A landmark
case in accord with this decision is Smith v. Texas,17 but the percentage of Negroes qualified for jury service and the amount of
exclusion from juries were not nearly so favorable to the defendant. Testimony of the Negro defendant's witnesses showed that
Negroes constituted over twelve percent of the population and
ten percent of the qualified jurors of Harris County. From 1931
to 1938 five Negroes had served on grand juries. The Court approved the Texas statutory scheme for selecting jurors and recog1582 F. Supp. 65.
16103 U.S. 370.
U.S. 128 (1940).
2-311
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nized that the evil lay in the manner in which it was administered
becuase of the great amount.of discretion placed in the officers who
administered it.
As seen in the Neal case it has been well established by the
Supreme Court that a total exclusion of a minority is prima facie
proof of discrimination, but when the issue moves out of the clear
realm of absolute into the shadow-zones of degrees, we find the
decisions of the Court have somewhat clouded the law. But the
Smith case still stands in its recognition of the problem as a matter
of law in which intent can be implied in the limitation situation.
The Court said in the Smith case speaking through Mr. Justice
Black:
The state argues that the testimony of the commissioners themselves shows that there was no arbitrary or
systematic exclusion. And it is true that two of the three
commissioners who drew the September, 1938 panel testified to that effect ... this is, at best, the testimony of
two individuals who participated in drawing one out of
the thirty-two jury panels discussed in the record. But
even if their testimony were to be given the greatest possible effect, and their situation considered typical of the
ninety-four commissioners who did not testify, we would
still feel compelled to reverse the decision below . . . if
there has been discrimination, whether accomplished ingeniously or ingenuously, the conviction cannot stand.
(Italics supplied.)
Cassell v. Texas,1 8 which was a natural outgrowth of the
Smith case, went somewhat further in that it intimated that the
social composition of jury panels according to distinctive classes
should not even be a factor in their selection. This case reversed
a conviction of a Negro defendant for murder beause the Supreme
Court found discrimination had been practiced in the selection
of grand juries in Dallas County, Texas. For a considerable period
of time covering the impaneling of twenty-one grand juries, selection had been purposely limited to not more than one Negro participant in any given grand jury. The Court conceded that on
the basis of eligibility, the limitation found was not such as to
deprive the race of proportional representation on the grand juries
functioning during the period under consideration. However, the
Court found a discernable limitation in that, " . . . chance alone
could not account for the regularity of the recurrent appearance
of only one and no more Negroes on any one of the series of grand
juries."
finding
of the Supreme
(or very
in proof
which ofnodiscriminaof time
periodcases
the Court
tion Many
Rave emphasized
few) members of the class discriminated against have served on
juries. In the case of Patton v. Mississippi,19 the Court held that
,8339 U.S. 282 (1947).
1"332 U.S. 463 (1947).
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the fact that no Negro had served on a criminal court grand or
petit jury for 30 years, although there were Negoes qualified,
created a strong presumption that Negroes were discriminated
against on account of color or race, and that the state must justify
the exclusion as having been brought about by some other reason.
Other cases in which the Supreme Court, reversing the conviction,
has stressed the length of time during which no Negroes had
served are: Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942) (Sixteen years) ;
Pierre v. La., 306 U.S. 354 (1939) (Forty years) ; Hale v. Ky.,
303 U.S. (1938) (thirty years) ; Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587
(1935) (A long number of years). Of course the real question
involved concerns the practice that produced the particular jury
indicting or trying the defendant, but past practice is considered
relevant unless the prosecution shows that old jury selection practices have been abandoned. If it can be shown that a residual of
improperly selected names from past practice remain in the present list, the Court will take this into consideration.20 To prove
discrimination it is important to show not only that no member
of the excluded class has served for a considerable period, but also
that there has been a number of such persons qualified to serve as
jurors. In these cases, figures as to population of the class discriminated against in proportion to the total population, are not
in themselves relevant except as they may help in determining the
matter which is relevant, namely, the proportion of the class eligible for jury service to all those persons who are eligible.
In U.S. v. Dennis,2' 1 U.S. v. Fujimoto,2" U.S. v. Frankfield,'
U.S. v. Mesarosh,2' and U.S. v. Flynn 25 motions challenging the
jury system were entered and denied. In these cases statistical
data was examined by the Court; it was found that certain classes,
both racial and economic, were not proportionally represented and
it was found also that in the first step of the selection process
names were secured from various private sources. Nevertheless,
the Court in each instance held that there was no intentional and
systematic discrimination. In reality it appears as if present day
courts are reluctant to extend the doctrines enumerated by the
Smith and Cassell cases to the recognition that classes other than
racial exist and can be discriminated against not only by ingeniousness but by ingenuousness. This was indicated in the case of
Fay v. New York 26 which did not involve a challenge to the jury
on the grounds of racial discrimination but on economic discrimination. The court stated in referring to the federal statute making it a crime for any state or federal officer to exclude jurors on
the ground of race or color only and indicated the relationship
between the 14th amendment and the statute:
" See U.S. v. Flynn. 106 F.

" 183 F.

(2d)

201 (1950).

-105 F. Supp. 727 (1952).
"101 F. Supp. 449 (1952).

F.R.D. 180 (1952).
Note 19, supra.
:6332 U.S. 261.
2413

Supp. 966.
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For us the majestic generalities of the Fourteenth
Amendment are thus reduced to a concrete statutory
command when cases involve race or color which is wanting in every other case of alleged discrimination.
This was the Supreme Court's way of limiting the effect of
the Smith and Cassell cases, but it is submitted that such reasoning should not apply to federal court cases because of the Supreme
Court's supervisory powers over them. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter said in Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co.:27
The process of justice must of course not be tainted
by property prejudice any more than by race or religious
prejudice . .. . This duty is formulated by the judicial
oath, to "administer justice without respect to persons,
and do equal right to the poor and the rich."
In this case five of the twelve jurors were of the employee
class, but the jury officials testified that they deliberately and
intentionally excluded from the jury lists all persons who work
for a daily wage. The basis for this exclusion given by the officials
was that the jury service imposed a financial hardship on daily
wage earners in that their daily wage was greater than their per
diem compensation for jury service. The Supreme Court held
that the intentional exclusion of daily wage earners as a class invalidated the panel. This case is a clear mandate from the Supreme
Court to Federal jury officials not to exclude anyone from selection for a jury panel merely because he or she is a member of an
economic or social class on the ground of hardship. The Court also
stated a proposition which has been followed in most courts in
that discrimination is a grounds for challenge irrespective of any
prejudice to the particular party to the action setting forth the
challenge:
On that basis it becomes unnecessary to determine
whether the petitioner was in any way prejudiced by the
wrongful exclusion or whether he was one of the excluded
class . . . it is likewise immaterial that the jury which
actually decided the factual issue in the case was found
to contain at least five members of the laboring class. The
evil lies in the admitted wholesale exclusion of a large
class of wage earners in disregard of the high standards
of jury selection.
The Thiel case is distinguishable from the Dennis, Frankfield,
Mesarosh, Fujimoto, Flynn and Fay decisions because its direct
testimony showed the discrimination as well as the objective data.
However, a very important unanimous decision was rendered on
May 3, 1954, by the Supreme Court in an opinion by Chief Justice
Warren that is indicative of a favorable trend toward recognizing
the true problem in challenging the impartiality of juries. Her2 328 U.S. 217.
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nandez v. Texas 28 decided two very important points which have
been stumbling blocks heretofore: (1) The recognition of people
of Mexican ethnic origin as a separate class to be contemplated
by the due process clause of the constitution as well as comprising
a class for purposes of deciding a fair social composition of juries,
and (2) patently contradicting the well established rule that proportional representation is not needed for impartiality and that
intent must be proved, the Court stated that it was not necessary
to establish such proof by direct testimony of officials (which was
lacking in the case), "but if data itself is sufficient, the result
bespeaks discrimination, whether or not it was a conscious decision on the part of any individual jury commissioner." An interesting aspect of the case was the Chief Justice's determination
of how the existence of a separate class is to be proved. Quoting
from the opinion:
One method by which this may be demonstrated is
by showing the attitude of the community. Here the testimony of responsible officials and citizens contained the
admission that residents of the community distinguished
between "white" and "Mexican." The participation of
persons of Mexican descent in business and community
groups was shown to be slight. Until very recent times,
children of Mexican descent were required to attend a
segregated school for the first four grades. At least one
restaurant in town prominently displayed a sign announcing "No Mexicans Served." On the courthouse grounds
at the time of the hearing, there were two men's toilets,
one unmarked and the other marked "Colored Men" and
"Hombres Aqui" (Men Here). No substantial evidence
was offered to rebut the logical inference to be drawn
from these facts, and it must be concluded that petitioner
succeeded in his proof.
B. Source of Selection
Under the requirement that a jury should 'be a body truly
representative of the community and not the organ of any special
group or class, the source of selection question was raised by the
defendant in Glasser v. U.S.,- 9 a case involving a conspiracy to
defraud the government by means of bribery of federal officials
dealing with bootleggers. Shortly before the case was tried, an
Illinois statute giving the right to women to serve as jurors was
passed. In order to conform .o this statute, names of women were
taken by the officials from a list furnished by the Illinois League
of Women Voters, and prepared exclusively from its membership.
Mr. Justice Murphy delivered the opinion of the Court and said:
The deliberate selection of jurors from the membership of particular private organizations definitely does
2'347 U.S. 475.
:'315 U.S. 86, 62 S. Ct. 472.
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not conform to the traditional requirements of jury trial.
No matter how high principled and imbued with a desire to inculcate public virtue such organizations may be,
the dangers inherent in such a method of selection are
the more real when the members of those organizations
from training or otherwise acquire a bias in favor of
the prosecution. The jury selected from the membership
of such an organization is then not only the organ of a
special class, but, in addition, it is also openly partisan.
If such practices are to be encountered, the hard won
right of trial by jury becomes a thing of doubtful value,
lacking one of the essential characteristics that have made
it a cherished feature of our institutions.
The Court did not include this issue as a grounds for its reversal
as the defendant merely offered proof by means of an affidavit,
which the prosecution had not stipulated would be satisfactory as
proof, but there is no doubt that substantial proof of private
sources of selection is grounds for reversal for discrimination as
to social composition of juries.
In the Dennis 3,, case, Judge L. Hand decided, in holding valid
the so-called "blue ribbon jury" and distinguishing the situation
from that in the Glasser case, that the Glasser case did not condemn the practice of accepting suggestions from various, private
groups such as the Federal Grand Jury Association. 31 What it
did condemn, according to the opinion, was calling from any one
group. The Court also stated that it was not proved that enough
of the proffered list remained as of the trial date to invalidate
as a whole and that even counting all of those names that could
possibly have been used from the proffered list, the jurors who
qualified out of them were "too little to deserve notice." The petitioners challenging the jury also raised three other points: (1)
territorial predilection for the wealthier districts, (2) classification in the panels according to occupations showed predominance
of employer as contrasted to employee groups, (3) conduct of
jury officials tending to show discrimination by the presence of
the letter "C" on all cards of Negroes on the list. The Court dismissed (1) by reasoning in essence that "nobody contends that
the list must be a sample of the whole community . . . the law
excludes those who do not satisfy the very modest financial minimums . . . and those who cannot pass on examination as to intelligence, character and general information" (New York State
requirements) and indicated in not so many words that it was
'183 F. (2d) 201.
Among organizations who submitted lists to the officials was the Federal
Grand Jury Association, a voluntary association of present or former grand
jurors. Its officers compiled lists of prospective jurors from WHO'S WHO IN
NEW YORK, WHO'S WHO IN ENGINEERING, THE SOCIAL REGISTER, the alumni direc-

tories of Princeton, Harvard, Yale and Dartmouth, POOR'S REGISTER OF EXECUTIVES, Tiin DIRECTORY OF DIRECTORS, and volunteers recommended by the Association.
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of the opinion that perhaps lower income groups for practical
purposes didn't meet this standard It also reiterated the established rule that cross sectional representation does not mean proportional representation as to classes. It dealt with (2) by stating
that classifications as to occupations are arbitrary and do not conform to the Census and cited the Fay case for authority. It dealt
with (3) by saying that there was no proof of intent in denominating the cards of Negroes with a "C" and stated that "only a
jaundiced mind can suppose that a public official in New York,
having no personal stake in the event, would hazard the risk of
detection for the sake of venting his bias against the race generally."
U.S. v. Flynn 32 was decided four years after the Dennis case
and similar objections to the jury were raised in what was the
second Foley Square, Smith Act, conspiracy to overthrow the
government case. During the four year period, the method of
selection had been obviously undertaken to be improved by the
officials as a result of the Dennis case challenges and it was admitted that since November 1, 1949, the voting'lists were the only
source of new names and that a "punch system" for choosing
names from the voting lists was inaugurated. In a very detailed
opinion the court discussed various objective statistical data presented by the defendants and set forth some very interesting
charts in the appendix, but the decision denies the connection between mathematically incorrect proportional representation and
discrimination.
C. Conduct of Official Tending to Show Discrimination
Many decisions have involved overt acts by jury officials which
in some instances have indicated discrimination. As has been
shown by the Dennis case, such overt acts do not necessarily convince the Court of intent but in some cases they do such as Avery
v. State of Georgia 33 where the jury box contained names of prospective white jurors printed on white tickets and names of prospective Negro jurors printed on yellow tickets. Without a single
Negro being selected, it established a prima facie case of discrimination.
Conduct involves also the use of questionnaires in the officials'
second and final step in the selection process. An unsuccessful
challenge to the array was made in the Mesarosh case on the
grounds that the use of the questionnaire constituted a pre-trial
investigation and surveillance of prospective jurors which was
condemned by the Supreme Court of the United States in Sinclair
v. U.S.34 How far the Supreme Court would extend the application of the rule is open to question because in the Sinclair case the
jurors were shadowed by private detectives. The content of the
prospective juror questionnaire was also challenged in the Mesar2106 F. Supp. 966.
"73 S. Ct. 89.
- 279 U.S. 749, 49 S. Ct. 471 (1929).
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osh case for improper questions which would tend to show discrimination. The Court only discussed one of these which was
"Are you opposed to the American form of Government?" In dismissing this and other questions as not improper, the Court held
that to be discriminatory there would have to be evidence in the
record indicating that the officials paid specific attention to the
particular question at issue, but the Court did not overturn the
general rule that intentional exclusion from a grand jury of all
persons belonging to the same political party or faction as the
defendant in a prosecution arising out of a political controversy
is a denial of the defendant's constitutional rights2 5 Although
the Court didn't discuss such a possibility, the issue could be
raised that questions of this type are unconstitutional under the
Fifth Amendment in violation of protection against self-incrimination.
D. Delegation of Authority
Two interesting cases were decided in the federal courts when
the procedure for selecting jurors for the United States District
in
Court for the 'Western District of Missouri was challengedwere
Walker v. U.S.:G and U.S. v. Shannaburger.p Form letters
sent by the clerk and jury commissioner to persons throughout
the district whom they considered "reliable" requesting the names,
occupations, and addresses of citizens of their acquaintance. Included in the letter was a statement that:
• .. it is the desire of the judge of this district to
obtain for jury service the best men in the community,
men of intelligence, unquestioned integrity, and who represent the best interest of the community. We do not want
men for this service simply because they have nothing
else to do, and who would like to spend the time and procure the pay for coming to court. We want men of business affairs . ..
The panels in both instances were challenged on two grounds.
First, that the letters indicated a purpose to discriminate against
wage earners and unemployed persons and, second, that the officials delegated their authority unlawfully to third parties. The
Courts answered the first contention by construing the letter
merely to request not the exclusion of wage earners and the inclusion only of capitalists, but the exclusion of hangers-on and loafers.
To the second contention, both courts stated- in effect that the
delegation was not unlawful because the officers had the final
choice and the manner of acquiring information was for them
to determine in the interests of practicality. The Glasser case
could be authority against such reasoning for the proposition that
See 82 L. Ed. 1058.
'093 F. (2d) 383 (1937).
'19 F. Supp. 975 (1937).
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the delegation38was improper on grounds that the sources of supply
were limited.
As discussed in the Shannaburgercase a suggestion in regard
to what should be the proper procedure in selecting names is that
the lists should in the first instance eminate from compilations
performed by the officials from voting lists or similar lists giving
a cross-section of the community and from them, questionnaires
could then be sent out to every name on said list. Such procedure
would require a nominal amount of additional effort and expense
and in the long run make for a more fair selection.3 9
In conclusion it is well to note that all the cases recognize
that the challenger has the burden of proving inpropriety. 40 This
means that the challenger must do more than allege discrimination
or even offer affidavits of discrimination. It must be proven by
evidence. In Neal v. Delaware 41 the prosecution had consented
to use of defendant's affidavit as evidence so in this case the conviction was reversed on the basis of this affidavit, but lacking such
consent the affidavit is not proof. 42 Nevertheless, if a defendant
offers relevant evidence to prove discrimination in support of
his motion to quash an indictment or challenge to the jury panels
and the trial court refuses to allow such4 proof, the Supreme Court
will reverse the defendants' conviction . .

NEW PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE
MONOGRAPHS
PLI is publishing a new edition of its widely used monograph
series on Fundamentals of Federal Taxation. Six monographs in
the PLI 1954 Revenue Code edition have already been issued.
These are Items of Gross Income, Deductions and Credits, Accounting Periods and Accounting Methods, Capital Gains and Losses,
Income Taxation of Estates and Trusts, and The Gift Tax. In
preparation are Tax-Free Exchanges, Corporations and Corporate
Distributions, Partnerships, The Estate Tax, Preparation and
Trial of Tax Cases, and The Tax Advisor's Approach. The subscription fee for the 12 monographs in this series is $15. Single
monographs are $2 each.
Also of timely interest is the new PLI monograph on "Understanding the Antitrust Laws" which is part of the Institute's
series on General Practice, and is fully annotated. Copies are $2
each. Address Practising Law Institute, 20 Vesey St., N. Y. 7, N. Y.
I In accord, see In Re Petition for Special Grand Jury D.C. Pa., 50 F. (2d)
973 (1931).
" In accord with the proposition that the selection of jurors is a non-delegable
administrative duty see Dow v. Carnegie, Ill. Steel Corp., 100 F. Supp. 494, and
U.S. v. Local 369, Int. Fishermen & Allied Workers, 70 F. Supp. 782.
40 Fay v. N.Y., 332 U. S. 261 supra and cases cited at 284-5.
"Note 14, supra.
'Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316; Brownfield v. S. C., 189 U.S. 426; Tarrance
v. Florida, 1S8 U.S. 519; Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 592.
4' Dow v. U.S. Steel Corp, C.A. Pa., 195 F. (2d) 478 (1952).
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OPEN LETTER
Mr. Louis G. Isaacson, President,
Denver Bar Association,
E & C Building,
Denver, Colorado.
Dear Mr. President:
Your legislative committee begs leave to report to you and
the Board of Trustees of the Denver Bar Association as follows:
Your committee has always felt that it had a two-fold obligation: (1) to draft, analyze and support legislation which was of
interest only to attorneys at law in order to make more certain
the tools with which lawyers work; (2) perhaps of even greater
importance is our obligation to protect, if possible, the rights of
the general public-the layman next door-the little man who
cannot afford expensive lobbyists. By performing the second function above-recited, it is our opinion that the bar association can
perform a real function on behalf of the public. The bar association has always been recognized as the champion of the American
way of life.
It is in this regard, that Senate Bill No. 75 by Senator Miller
is called to your attention. Senate Bill No. 75 is an act to control
the distribution and sale of psittacine birds and to control the
spread of psittacosis.
In the opinion of your committee, the definitions of psittacine
birds and of psittacosis are not inclusive and, after a great deal
of study, your committee raises a question in that we feel that
the bill is intended to affect those birds which for a large period
of time have nested on the outskirts of the City and County of
Denver. As the urban areas grew and annexed additional territory, the rural birds living in such annexed territory became
psittafied birds.
The definition of psittacine birds includes Mexican doubleheads, African greys and'other birds of the order psittaciformes.
We are informed that other birds of the order psittaciformes include the full-breasted push-over, the extra-marital lark and the
strumpeter's swan. This being true, we think that there are some
parts of the proposed bill which are commendable on behalf of
the general public. For example, such birds are required to wear
a seamless leg band. We feel, however, that subsection 2 of page
3, affecting the importation of such birds may be in contravention
of the Mann Act. Lines 20 through 23 on page 3 of the printed
bill provide that zoological parks may hold such birds for trade.
The section of the bill which gives us the greatest concern is section 66-21-12 (page 7 of the printed bill) which makes the breeding of such birds unlawful.
The legislative committee feels that it is our obligation to call
this bill to the attention of the bar association. We await further
instructions from you.
Respectfully,
DONALD M. LESHER

